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In  business  circles,  and  even  in  political  discussions, 
the  question  is  very  often  raised,  how  the  rate  of 
interest  affects  the  prices  of  commodities.  The 
practical  business  man  is  perhaps  most  often  in- 
clined  to  believe  that  an  increase  in  the  rate  of 
interest  is  bound  to  increase  the  cost  of  all  products 
and  therefore  to  enhance  prices,  and  he  finds  it 
very  confusing  when  he hears  a  scientific  economist 
or  a  representative  of  a  central  bank  proclaim  that 
the  rate  is  increased  in  order  to  force  prices  down. 
It  is  obviously  the  duty  of  economic  science  to  re- 
move  this  confusion  .  .  .  . 
GUSTAV  CASSEL  [l,  p. 329] 
Whenever  the  Fed  seeks  to  fight  inflation  with 
restrictive  monetary  policy,  a  debate  erupts  between 
tight-money  proponents  and  members  of the  so-called 
interest  cost-push  school.  The  former  group  argues 
that  higher  interest  rates  associated  with  tight  money 
are  necessarily  anti-inflationary  because  they  help 
choke  off  the  excess  aggregate  demand  that  puts 
upward  pressure  on  prices,  The  latter  contingent, 
however,  insists  that  higher  interest  rates  are  inher- 
ently  inflationary  because  they  raise  the  interest 
component  of  business  costs,  costs  that  must  be 
passed  on  in  the  form  of higher  prices.  According  to 
the  latter  view,  lower,  not  higher,  interest  rates  are 
consistent  with  lower  prices.  Low  interest  rates,  the 
argument  goes,  would  lead  to  lower  interest  costs 
and  therefore  to  lower  prices  of final  products.  Long- 
time  Congressman  Wright  Patman  of  Texas  was 
perhaps  the  best-known  proponent  of  this  view.l 
Missing  from  the  debate  is  a careful  and  systematic 
attempt  to  refute  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine. 
Few  economists  today  regard  the  doctrine  as  im- 
portant  enough  to  warrant  rebuttal,  As  Professors 
Lawrence  Ritter  and  William  Silber  note  in  their 
widely-used  textbook  Money  [5,  p. 100],  most  pro- 
fessional  economists  today  simply  refuse  to  take  the 
doctrine  seriously  and  therefore  typically  tend  to 
dismiss  it  out  of  hand. 
1 The  pure  interest  cost-push  doctrine  should  not  be  con- 
fused  with  the  related  argument  that  low  interest  rates 
help  restrain  inflation  by  encouraging  capital  formation 
that  enhances  labor  productivity,  lowers  unit  labor  costs, 
and  increases  potential  output.  Unlike  the  interest  cost- 
push  doctrine,  which  asserts  that  interest  rates  affect 
prices  directly  through  costs,  this  latter  argument  holds 
that  interest  rates  affect  prices  indirectly  through  their 
prior  impact  on  capital  formation.  Both  arguments,  of 
course,  are  advanced  by  modern  proponents  of  low  in- 
terest  rate  easy-money  policies. 
For  the  definitive  refutation  of  the  interest  cost- 
push  doctrine,  it  is  necessary  to  go  to  the  late  19th- 
and  early  20th-century  writings  of  the  great  Swedish 
economist  Knut  Wicksell,  particularly  his  critique  of 
the  monetary  doctrines  of  Thomas  Tooke.  Tooke,  a 
formidable  British  monetary  controversialist,  leader 
of  the  so-called  Banking  school,  author  of  the  monu- 
mental  six  volume  History  of  Prices  (1838-57),  and 
foremost  collector  of  price  and  monetary  data  in  the 
19th  century,  had  advanced  the  interest  cost-push 
argument  that  high  interest  rates  cause  high  prices 
and  low  rates  low  prices.  Wicksell  responded  by 
exposing  the  fallacies  in  Tooke’s  argument  and  by 
demonstrating  with  the  aid  of  a  simple  macroeco- 
nomic  model  that,  contrary  to  Tooke’s  contention, 
high  interest  rate  tight-money  policies  are  inherently 
anti-inflationary  whereas  low  interest  rate  easy- 
money  policies  are  inflationary.  In  so  doing,  Wick- 
sell  established  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the 
tight-money  view. 
This  article  examines  the  Tooke-Wicksell  contro- 
versy  and  shows  how  Wicksell’s  analysis  effectively 
answers  the  contentions  raised  by  the  interest  cost- 
push  school.  The  Tooke-Wicksell  controversy  is 
important  not  only  because  it  produced  the  first  clear 
statement  of  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine  as  well 
as  the  first  rigorous  and  systematic  attempt  to  dis- 
prove  it,  but  also  because  it  helped  establish  the  case 
for  tight  money  and  because  it  introduced  the  proto- 
type  of the  analytical  macroeconomic  model  that  most 
monetary  authorities  use  today  in  designing  anti- 
inflationary  monetary  policies. 
Thomas  Tooke  and  the  Emergence  of  the  Interest 
Cost-Push  Doctrine  The  controversy  began  with 
Tooke’s  1844  attack  on what  he  called  “the  commonly 
received  opinion”  that  low  money  rates  of  interest 
raise  prices  and  high  rates  depress  them.  [8,  p.  77] 
Tooke  emphatically  rejected  this  conventional  view, 
arguing  instead  that  a  lowering  of  loan  rates  tends  to 
reduce,  not  raise,  prices.  Focusing  solely  on  the  cost 
aspects  of  interest  and  ignoring  the  influence  on 
prices  of  interest-induced  increases  in  borrowing, 
lending,  the  money  stock,  and  spending,  he  asserted 
that  a  reduced  loan  rate  “has  no  . . . tendency  to  raise 
the  prices  of  commodities.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a 
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quently  of  cheapness.”  [8,  p.  123]  He  then  pro- 
ceeded  to  elaborate  this  point  in  a  passage  that 
Representative  Wright  Patman  would  have  heartily 
endorsed. 
A  general  reduction  in  the  rate  of  interest  is 
equivalent  to  or  rather  constitutes  a  diminution  of 
the cost  of  production  .  . . . in  all  cases  where  an 
outlay  of  capital  is required  . . .  [T]he  diminished 
cost  of  production  hence  arising  would,  by  the 
competition  of  producers,  inevitably  cause  a fall  of 
prices  of  all  the articles  into  the cost  of  which  the 
interest  of  money  entered  as an  ingredient.  [8,  p. 
81] 
Written  in  1844,  these  passages  are  virtually  iden- 
tical  to  Patman’s  1952  assertion  that  “the  more  in- 
terest  that  business  must  pay  for  the  capital  it  uses 
the  more  it  adds  to  the  cost  of  doing  business.  To 
that  extent,  increases  in  interest  rates  are  inflation- 
ary.”  [3,  p.  735]  Tooke’s  statements,  like  those  of 
Patman,  embody  all  the  essentials  of  the  interest 
cost-push  doctrine,  namely  (1)  the  notion  that  inter- 
est  rates  influence  prices  chiefly  through  costs,  (2) 
the  idea  that  movements  of  interest  rates  and  prices 
are  positively  correlated,  (3)  the  denial  that  low 
interest  rates  are  inflationary,  and  (4)  the  contrary 
assertion  that  low  rates  in  fact  tend  to  reduce  prices 
rather  than  to  raise  them.  Tooke  believed  that  these 
propositions,  particularly  the  last,  were  amply  con- 
firmed  by  the  facts. 
And  the  presumption  accordingly  is  [he  writes] 
that  the  very  reduced  rate  of  interest  which  has 
prevailed  within  the  last  two  years  must  have 
operated  as  one  of  the  contributing  causes  of  the 
great  reduction  of  prices  .  .  .  which  has  occurred 
coincidentally  with  reduction  in  the  rate  of  interest. 
[8,  p.  81] 
To  Tooke,  at  least,  it  was  obvious  that  a  policy  of 
pegging  interest  rates  at  arbitrarily  low  levels  would 
not  produce  inflation. 
Wicksell’s  Critique  of  the  Interest  Cost-Push 
Doctrine  Tooke’s  interest  cost-push  doctrine 
went  largely  unnoticed  for  more  than  50  years  until 
Knut  Wicksell  challenged  it  in  the  closing  years  of 
the  century.  Wicksell’s  extensive  comments  on  the 
doctrine--comments  that  Arthur  Marget  described 
as  “the  clearest  statement  we  have  on  the  subject” 
[2,  p. 248]  -may  be  found  in  his  Interest  and  Prices 
(1898)  and  in  the  second  volume  of  his  Lectures  on 
Political  Economy  (1905).  In  these  works  he  criti- 
cized  the  doctrine  on  several  grounds. 
Confusion  of  Relative  Prices  and  Absolute  Prices 
First,  he  argued  that  the  interest  cost-push  proposi- 
tion  confuses  relative  prices  with  the  general  level  of 
prices. 
the  proposition  that  prices  of  commodities  de- 
pend on their  costs of  production  and rise and fall 
with  them, has  a  meaning  only  in  connection  with 
relative  prices.  To  apply  this  proposition  to  the 
general  level of  money prices  involves  a generaliza 
tion  which  is not only  fallacious  but of  which  it  is 
in fact  impossible to give  any clear  account.  It can 
be concluded then that . . . Tooke’s  proposition  must 
be regarded  as false,  both in theory and in practice, 
[9,  pp.  99-100] 
In  particular,  Tooke  fails  to  perceive  that  interest 
rate  movements  cannot  possibly  influence  the  price 
level  if,  as  he  assumes,  total  spending  and  real  output 
remain  unchanged.  With  these  magnitudes  fixed. 
interest  rate  changes  will  affect  only  relative  prices 
but  not  the  absolute  level  of  prices.  The  latter  vari- 
able,  Wicksell  argued,  is  determined  by  aggregate 
demand  and  supply.  Therefore  interest  rate  move- 
ments  cannot  affect  it  unless  they  alter  either  aggre- 
gate  demand  or  aggregate  supply.  In  terms  of  the 
equation  of  exchange  P  =  MV/Y,  where  P  is  the 
price  level,  M  the  money  stock,  V  its  velocity  of 
circulation,  and  Y  real  output,  interest  rate  move- 
ments  will  not  affect  P  unless  they  alter  MV  (i.e., 
total  spending)  or  Y  (i.e.,  real  output).  If  these 
aggregates  remain  unchanged,  the  price  level  also  will 
remain  unchanged.  Interest  rate  movements  in  this 
case  will  affect  relative  prices,  to  be  sure.  Some 
prices  will  rise  and  some  will  fall,  but  the  average  of 
all  prices  will  remain  unchanged.  For  example,  a 
rise  in  the  market  rate  of  interest  would  tend  to  raise 
the  particular  prices  of  interest-intensive  goods,  i.e., 
goods  in  which  interest  accounts  for  a  significant 
portion  of  total  costs.  Confronted  with  the  price  in- 
creases,  purchasers  would  demand  fewer  of  these 
goods,  thereby  leading  producers  to  cut  back  output 
and  lay  off  labor  and  other  factor  resources.  The 
resources  released  from  the  interest-intensive  indus- 
tries  would  seek  employment  in  the  noninterest- 
intensive  industries  tending  to  drive  down  wages  and 
prices  there.  The  net  result  would  be  a  change  in  the 
structure,  but  not  the  overall  level,  of  prices. 
To  summarize,  Wicksell  held  that,  given  the  level 
of  total  spending  and  real  output,  interest-induced 
changes  in  the  prices  of  specific  commodities  would 
be  offset  by  compensating  changes  in  the  prices  of 
others,  leaving  the  aggregate  price  level  stable:.  In 
this  regard  he  noted  that  a  fall  in  the  rate  of  interest 
would  tend  to  lower  the  specific  prices  of  capital- 
intensive  goods,  thereby  reducing  the  outlay  required 
to  purchase  those  items  and  increasing  the  amount 
available  for  spending  on  other  goods.  The  resulting 
increased  spending  on  these  latter  items  would  bid  up 
their  prices  enough  to  offset  the  drop  in  the  prices 
of  the  former  items,  thereby  leaving  the  average  of 
prices  unaltered.  As  Wicksell  put  it 
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tuations  in the relative  prices  of  both these  groups 
of  commodities,  but  cannot  exercise  a  depressing 
influence  on the general  price-level  except  in so far 
as  it  increases  the  actual  volume  of  goods.  the 
[quantity]  of  money  remaining  stable, and possibly 
gives  rise  to  a  slower  circulation  of  money.  [10, 
p.  180] 
Since  Tooke  says  nothing  about  the  monetary,  out- 
put,  or  velocity  effects  of  interest  rate  changes  he 
cannot  explain  how  such  changes  affect  general 
prices. 
Behavior  of  Noninterest  Elements  of  Cost  Wick- 
sell  also  criticized  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine’s 
tendency  to  assume  that  all  noninterest  components 
of  costs  remain  unchanged  when  interest  rates 
change.  If  this  assumption  were  true,  costs  and 
prices  would,  as  Tooke  asserts,  fully  register  under- 
lying  changes  in the  interest  rate.  Wicksell,  however, 
denied  the  validity  of  this  assumption.  Noninterest 
cost  elements,  he  argued,  would  not  remain  fixed  in 
the  face  of  interest  rate  changes.  Instead  they  would 
vary  and  in  so  doing  would  offset  or  nullify  the  im- 
pact  of  interest  rate  changes  on  total  costs.  More 
precisely,  a  fall  in  the  rate  of  interest  would  tend  to 
result  in  compensating  rises  in  wages  and  rents, 
leaving  total  costs  unchanged.  As  Wicksell  ex- 
pressed  it: 
[Tooke’s]  argument  is  based  on  the  inadmissible, 
not  to  say  impossible,  assumption  that  wages  and 
rent  would  at  the  same  time  remain  constant, 
whereas in reality  a lowering  of the rate of  interest 
is equivalent  to a raising  of  the shares of  the other 
factors  of  production  in  the  product.  [10,  p.  183] 
The  mechanism  whereby  a  fall  in  the  interest  rate 
raises  the  relative  shares  of  the  other  factors  is  as 
follows:  The  fall  in  the  interest  rate  initially  reduces 
costs  relative  to  prices,  thus  giving  profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs  an  incentive  to  expand  their  oper- 
ations.  To  expand  operations,  however,  entrepre- 
neurs  must  hire  more  land  and  labor.  Assuming 
those  resources  are  already  fully  employed,  the  re- 
sulting  increased  competition  for  them  only  serves  to 
bid  up their  prices,  thereby  raising  the  rent  and  wage 
components  of  total  costs.  In  this  manner  the  fall  in 
the  interest  component  of  business  costs  is  counter- 
balanced  by  rises  in  the  wage  and  rent  components 
with  the  aggregate  level  of costs  and  prices  remaining 
unchanged. 
Interest  Rates,  the  Balance  of  Payments,  and 
Gold  Flows  Wicksell’s  third  criticism  of  the 
high-interest-rates-cause-high-prices  argument  is  that 
it  is  in  apparent  “conflict  with  the  well-accredited 
fact  that  a  rise  in  the  rate  of  interest  has  always 
shown  itself  to be  the  appropriate  method  of checking 
an  unfavorable  balance  of payments  and  of instigating 
a  flow  of  bullion  from  abroad.”  In  other  words,  the 
doctrine  cannot  explain  why  rises  in  the  bank  rate 
tend  to correct  trade  balance  deficits  and  reverse  gold 
outflows.  For  according  to  the  interest  cost  doctrine, 
such  rises  should,  by  pushing  up  domestic  prices 
relative  to  foreign  ones,  worsen  the  trade  balance 
instead  of  improving  it. 
If  Tooke’s  view  were  correct  we  should  be  con- 
fronted  by  the  curious  situation  . .  . that  in  order 
to  improve  the  discount  rate  and  the  balance  of 
trade,  the  banks  would  take  steps  which,  on  his 
theory?  would  lead  to  higher  costs  of  production 
and  higher  prices  and  to  a  further  restriction  of 
the  already  too  limited  export  of  goods.  [10,  p. 
186] 
Conversely, 
the  opposite  case  of  a  favorable  balance  of  pay- 
ments  leads  to  equally  absurd  consequences.  A 
favorable  balance  would  cause an inflow  of  bullion, 
and this  clearly  would  . . . bring  about  a  lowering 
of  the  rate  of  interest.  The  result  according  to 
Tooke  would  be  a  still  further  fall  in  domestic 
prices  .  . . so that  the  balance  of  payments  would 
become more and more  favorable  and money would 
flow  in  on an ever-increasing  scale.  [9,  p.  99] 
In  short,  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine  implies,  con- 
trary  to  fact,  that  the  foreign  trade  balance  is  per- 
petually  in  unstable  equilibrium,  with  trade  deficits 
or  surpluses  becoming  progressively  larger  and 
larger  in  a  monotonic  explosive  sequence. 
Credit  Market  Instability  Wicksell  also  pointed 
out  that  Tooke’s  doctrine  implies  that  money  and 
credit  markets  are  likewise  in  a  state  of  dynamic  in- 
stability.  For  if  it  were  true  that  a  fall  in  interest 
rates  produces  a  drop  in  prices,  then  a  lower  money 
rate  of  interest  would  lead  to  reductions  in  borrow- 
ing,  lending,  and  money  creation  and  thus  to  further 
downward  pressure  on  money  rates.  That  is,  with 
lower  prices,  less  money  and  credit  would  be required 
to  finance  the  same  level  of  real  transactions.  The 
demand  for  loans  would  therefore  contract  and  money 
would  flow  into  the  banks.  In  an  effort  to  expand 
loans  and  reduce  excess  reserves,  banks  would  lower 
the  rate  of  interest  still  further  causing  a  further 
drop  in  prices  and  a  further  decline  in  the  demand 
for  loans.  Via  this  sequence  the  rate  of  interest 
would  eventually  fall  to  zero.  Conversely,  a  rise  in 
the  interest  rate  would,  according  to  Tooke’s  theory, 
produce  a  rise  in  prices  that  leads,  via  a  rising  de- 
mand  for  loans,  to  further  increases  in  the  interest 
rate  and  prices  and  so  on  in  an  explosive  upward 
spiral.  “In  other  words,  the  money  rate  of  interest 
would  be  in  a  state  of  unstable  equilibrium,  every 
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in  a  perpetual  vicious  circle.”  [10,  p.  187] 
In  actuality,  however,  money  and  credit  markets 
are  not  in  unstable  equilibrium.  This  fact,  Wicksell 
writes,  is clearly  a stumbling  block  for  Tooke’s  theory 
and  is  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting  it.  [10,  p.  186] 
Natural  Rate  Versus  Market  Rate  of  Interest 
Finally,  Wicksell  criticized  the  interest  cost-push 
doctrine  for  failing  to  distinguish  between  the  market 
and  natural  or  equilibrium  rate  of  interest.  The 
former  of  course  is  the  loan  rate  or  cost  of  money. 
The  latter,  however,  is  the  expected  marginal  yield 
or  internal  rate  of  return  on  newly-created  units  of 
physical  capital.  It  is  also  the  rate  that  equilibrates 
desired  real  saving  with  intended  real  investment  at 
the  economy’s  full-capacity  level  of  output.  Or  what 
amounts  to  the  same  thing,  it  is  the  rate  that  equates 
aggregate  demand  for  real  output  with  the  available 
supply.  This  latter  definition  implies  that  the  natural 
rate  is  also  the  interest  rate  that  is  neutral  with  re- 
spect  to  general  prices,  tending  neither  to  raise  nor 
to  lower  them.  In  other  words,  if  the  market  rate 
were  at  the  level  of  the  natural  rate,  price  stability 
would  prevail. 
On  the  basis  of  the  foregoing  analysis  Wicksell 
held  that  price  movements  are  generated  by  the 
differential  between  the  two  rates  and  not,  as  Tooke 
claimed,  by  the  absolute  level  of  the  market  rate 
alone.  In  other  words,  the  level  of  the  market  rate 
per  se  is  irrelevant,  contrary  to  Tooke’s  theory.  The 
market  rate,  whether  high  or  low,  rising  or  falling, 
cannot  affect  general  prices  as  long  as  it  remains 
equal  to  the  natural  rate.  For  if  the  two  rates  are 
equal,  intended  capital  formation  equals  intended  real 
saving,  aggregate  real  demand  therefore  equals  ag- 
gregate  real  supply,  and  price  stability  results.  Only 
if  the  market  rate  deviates  from  the  natural  rate 
would  price  changes  occur. 
Wicksell’s  Model  The  foregoing  summarizes 
Wicksell’s  purely  negative  criticism  of  the  interest 
cost-push  doctrine.  His  positive  contribution  con- 
sists  of  a  theory  of  how  interest  rate  movements 
influence  prices  not  through  costs  but  rather  through 
excess  aggregate  demand  supported  and  financed  by 
money  growth.  His  theory  concludes,  contrary  to  the 
interest  cost-push  doctrine,  that  high  interest  rate 
tight-money  policies  are  anti-inflationary  while  low 
interest  rate  easy-money  policies  are  inflationary.  He 
reached  these  conclusions  via  the  following  route. 
First,  he  argued  that  the  excess  of  investment  over 
saving  at full  employment  is determined  by  the  differ- 
ence  between  the  natural  and  the  market  rates  of 
interest.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  natural  rate  is 
the  rate  that  equilibrates  real  investment  and  real 
saving.  As  long  as  the  market  rate  is  equal  to  the 
natural  rate,  saving  will  equal  investment  and  the 
economy  will  be  in  equilibrium.  But  if  the  market 
rate  should  fall  below  the  natural  rate  there  will  be 
an  excess  of  desired  investment  over  desired  saving. 
The  explanation  is  straightforward.  Given  the  natu- 
ral  rate,  a  fall  in  the  market  rate  lowers  the  cost  of 
capital  relative  to  its  yield  thereby  stimulating  in- 
vestment.  At  the  same  time,  the  fall  in  the  market 
rate  lowers  the  reward  to  thrift  thereby  discouraging 
saving.  Investment  expands  and  saving  contracts 
producing  an  excess  of  the  former  over  the  latter.2 
The  opposite  happens  when  the  market  rate  is  raised 
above  the  natural  rate,  i.e.,  desired  saving  exceeds 
desired  investment.  The  relationship  between  the 
investment-saving  gap  and  the  natural-market  inter- 
est  rate  differential  may  be  expressed  as 
(1)  I-S  = a( -R) 
where  I  is  investment,  S  saving,  the  exogenously- 
determined  natural  rate  of  interest,  R  the  market 
rate,  and  a  is  a  constant  coefficient  relating  the  in- 
terest  rate  differential  to  the  investment-saving  gap. 
Second,  Wicksell  assumed  that  the  gap  between 
investment  and  saving  generates  a  corresponding  ex- 
pansion  in  the  demand  for  bank  loans,  i.e., 
where  is  the  change  in  the  demand  for  bank  loans, 
the  dot  signifying  the  rate  of  change  (time  deriva- 
tive)  of  the  attached  loan  demand  variable.  This 
equation  states  that  when  the  investment  demand  for 
loanable  funds  exceeds  the  funds  supplied  by  volun- 
tary  saving,  there  will  be  an  expansion  in the  demand 
for  bank  loans  to  cover  the  difference. 
Third,  Wicksell  assumed  that  the  banking  system 
accommodates  the  extra  loan  demand  with  a  corre- 
sponding  expansion  of  loan  supply,  i.e., 
where  is  the  expansion  in  the  supply  of  bank 
loans.  This  equation  implies  a perfectly  elastic  supply 
of  loans  and  thus  corresponds  to  Wicksell’s  statement 
that 
2 “If  the banks  lend  their money  at materially  lower  rates 
than  the  normal  [i.e.,  natural]  rate  .  .  .  then  in  the  first 
place  saving  will  be  discouraged  .  .  .  .  In  the  second 
place,  the  profit  opportunities  of  entrepreneurs  will  thus 
be  increased  and  the  demand  for  [investment]  goods  . . . 
will  evidently  increase  .  .  .  ."  [10,  p.  194] 
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stock  consists  entirely  of  demand  deposits  and  no 
reserve  constraint  exists  to limit  loan expansion  as 
when  the  central  bank  stands  ready  to  provide 
unlimited  reserves  to  the  banking  system  in  order 
to  prevent  market  rates  from  rising]  the  banks 
can  always  satisfy  any  demand whatever  for  loans 
and  at  rates  of  interest  however  low  . . . .  [10,  p. 
194] 
Fourth,  he  maintained  that  money  growth  exactly 
matches  bank  loan  expansion  dollar  for  dollar.  In 
his  own  words,  “bank  deposits  and  bank  loans  must 
always  march  together.”  [10,  p. 86]  This  condition 
can  be  expressed  as 
where  is  the  expansion  of  the  money  stock.  The 
money  stock  expands  identically  with  loans  because 
new  loans  are  granted  in  the  form  of  increases  in  the 
checking  deposits  of  borrowers  and  these  deposits 
are  part  of  the  money  supply. 
Fifth,  he  held  that  growth  in  the  money  stock  is 
accompanied  by corresponding  increases  in  aggregate 
demand  (total  spending)  for  an  exogenously-given 
full  capacity  level  of  real  output.  Given  this  level  of 
real  output- which  Wicksell  treats  as  a  fixed  con- 
stant  throughout  his  analysis3  -the  increased  spend- 
ing  manifests  itself  in  the  form  of  excess  demand  in 
the  commodity  market.  In  this  way  money  growth 
converts  the  excess  desired  demand  implicit  in  the 
investment-saving  discrepancy  of  Equation  1  into 
excess  effective  demand.  The  relationship  between 
money  growth  and  excess  demand  may  be  expressed 
as 
(5)  E= 
where  E  is  excess  demand.  This  equation  states  that 
excess  demand  cannot  occur  without  an  identical 
amount  of  money  growth  to  support  and  finance  it. 
Finally,  he  argued  that  prices  are  bid  up  by  excess 
demand,  with  the  rate  of  price  rise  being  roughly 
proportional  to  the  level  of  excess  demand.4  The 
3 Regarding  the  full  employment  assumption  Wicksell 
states  that "we  are  entitled  to  assume  that  all  production 
forces  are  already  fully  employed,  so  that  the  increased 
monetary  demand  .  .  . leads  to  an  .  .  .  increased  demand 
for  commodities,  [and]  to  a  rise  in  the  price  of  all  .  .  . 
goods  . .  .  .”  [10,  p.  195]  Note  also  that  he dismisses  as 
unimportant  the  possibility  that  an  interest-induced  rise 
in  capacity  output  might  work  to  lower  prices.  This 
price-reducing  output  effect,  he  said,  would  be  “very 
small.”  More  important,  it  would  “occur  only  once  and 
for  all”  and  thus  would  be  swamped  by  the  cumulative 
(i.e.,  continuous)  rise  in  prices  stemming  from  the  in- 
terest  rate  differential.  [9.  pp.  142-3] 
4 Note  his  assertion  that  “This  increased  demand  .  .  . 
necessarily  results  in  a  rise in all prices -a  rise  which  it 
is  simplest  to  regard  as  proportional to  the  increase  in 
demand.”  [9,  p.  144] 
relationship  between  the  rate  of price  change  and  the 
level  of  excess  demand  can  be  expressed  as 
(6)  =  bE 
zero. 
where  is  the  rate  of  price  rise,  the  dot  signifying 
the  rate  of  change  (time  derivative)  of  the  attached 
price  level  variable,  and  b  is  a  constant  coefficient 
relating  excess  demand  to  price  changes.  According 
to  the  equation,  prices  will  rise  when  excess  demand 
is  positive,  fall  when  excess  demand  is  negative,  and 
stabilize  at  a  constant  level  when  excess  demand  is 
Taken  together  Equations  l-6  constitute  a  simple 
macrodynamic  model in which a decline  in the market 
rate  of  interest  below  the  natural  rate  results in 
excess  demand  that  bids  up  prices  with  the  money 
stock  simultaneously  expanding  to  accommodate  and 
validate  the  price  increases.  The  model  can  be  con- 
densed  to  a  single  reduced  form  equation  by  substi- 
tuting  Equations  1-5  into  Equation  6  to  yield 
which  says  that  the  ultimate  cause  of  price  level 
changes  is  the  differential  between  the  natural  and 
market  rates  of  interest.  According  to  the  equation, 
prices  rise  if  the  market  rate  is  below  the  natural 
rate,  fall  if  the  market  rate  is  above  the  natural  rate, 
and  remain  stable-i.e.,  neither  rise  nor  fall-if  the 
market  rate  equals  the  natural  rate.  Similar  equa- 
tions  can  be  derived  for  the  money  growth  and  excess 
demand  variables  showing  that  they  too  are  deter- 
mined  solely  by  the  interest  rate  differential. 
On  the  basis  of  Equation  7  Wicksell  reached  sev- 
eral  conclusions  contradicting  Tooke’s  interest  cost- 
push  doctrine.  First,  given  the  natural  rate,  a  policy 
of  pegging  the  market  rate  at  arbitrarily  low  levels 
will  produce  a cumulative  rise  in  prices.  As  Wicksell 
himself  put  it,  if  the  banks  “were  to  lower  their  rate 
of  interest,  say  1  percent  below  its  ordinary  [i.e., 
natural]  level,  and  keep  it  so  for  some  years,  then 
the  prices  of  all  commodities  would  rise  and  rise  and 
rise  without  any  limit  whatever.”  [ll,  p.  547]  In 
other  words,  contrary  to  Tooke’s  doctrine,  a  low 
interest  rate  cheap-money  policy  is  inflationary. 
Second,  if  prices  are  rising,  the  market  rate  is  too 
low  and  must  be  raised  to  slow  and  ultimately  stop 
the  inflation.  This  will  require  a  reduction  and 
eventually  a  cessation  of  money  growth.  Therefore 
a higher  interest  rate  tight-money  policy  is  inherently 
anti-inflationary,  contrary  to  the  interest  cost-push 
doctrine. 
Third,  a  rise  in  the  market  rate  above  the  natural 
rate  will  produce  an  absolute  decrease  in  the  price 
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interest  is  maintained  no  matter  how  little  above  the 
current  level  of  the  natural  rate,  prices  will  fall  con- 
tinuously  and  without  limit.”  [9,  p.  120]  Thus,  far 
from  being  inflationary  as  Tooke  claimed,  higher 
interest  rates  may  well  be  exactly  the  opposite,  i.e., 
deflationary. 
To  summarize,  given  the  natural  rate  of  interest, 
the  rate  of  price  increase  varies  inversely,  not  di- 
rectly,  with  changes  in  the  market  rate.  Thus  lower 
rates  are  inflationary  and  higher  rates  anti-inflation- 
ary,  contrary  to  Tooke’s  interest  cost-push  doctrine. 
Tooke  Versus  Wicksell  on  the  Gibson  Paradox 
Finally,  Wicksell  used his model to counter Tooke's 
claim  that  the  statistical  data  offered  strong  empirical 
support  for  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine.  Tooke’s 
own  empirical  studies  had  established  that  historically 
interest  rates  and  prices  tend  to  move  up  and  down 
together-a  phenomenon  that  Keynes  was  later  to 
call  the  Gibson  paradox.  On  the  basis  of  these 
studies,  Tooke  had  argued  that  the  coincidental  move- 
ments  of  interest  rates  and  prices  constituted  strong 
empirical  proof  that  high  interest  rates  cause  high 
prices  and  low  rates  low  prices.  Wicksell,  however, 
disagreed.  He  denied  that  the  positive  correlation 
between  movements  in  interest  rates  and  prices  im- 
plied  that  the  former  caused  the  latter.  Instead,  he 
argued  that  both  rising  interest  rates  and  rising  prices 
stemmed  from  a  common  cause,  namely  exogenous 
shifts  in  the  natural  rate-due  to  technological 
change,  innovation,  and  other  external  developments 
-followed  by  corresponding  lagged  adjustments  in 
the  market  rate.5  He  explained  how  the  lag  in  the 
adjustment  of  the  passive  market  rate  to  the  active 
natural  rate  could  result  in  coincidental  rises  in  in- 
terest  rates  and  prices.  The  lag,  he  said,  meant  that 
while  the  market  rate  was  rising  it  was  still  below 
the  natural  rate,  thereby  causing  excess  aggregate 
demand  and  hence  a  continuous  rise  in  prices. 
tion  and  into  nonmonetary  industrial  uses.  To  halt 
these  drains  and  protect  their  reserves  banks  are 
forced  to  raise  the  loan  rate  until  it  eventually  equals 
the  natural  rate.  In  this  way  rising  prices  serve  as 
the  connecting  link  between  the  natural  and  market 
rates  of  interest.  This  link  may  be  expressed  by  the 
relationship 
where  is  the  rate  of  change  of  the  market  rate  of 
interest  and  c  is  a  coefficient  relating  price  changes 
to  changes  in  the  market  rate. 
The  foregoing  equation,  which  states  that  interest 
rate changes  are proportional  to  level  changes, 
reconciles  Wicksell’s  theoretical  model  with  Tooke’s 
empirical  findings  of  a  positive  correlation  between 
movements  in  interest  rates  and  prices.  The  equation 
shows  that  interest  rates  and  prices  rise  and  fall  to- 
gether.  Yet,  within  the  context  of  Wicksell’s  entire 
model,  the  equation  does  not  imply  that  higher  in- 
terest  rates  produce  higher  prices.  On  the  contrary, 
the  model  states  that  both  the  rise  in  prices  and  the 
rise  in  the  interest  rate  are  caused  by  that  interest 
rate  being  too  low  relative  to  the  natural  rate.  In 
sum,  Wicksell  held  that  an  initial  rise  in  the  natural 
rate  relative  to  the  market  rate  generates  the  price 
increases  that  feed  back  into  the  market  rate  causing 
it  to  rise  toward  the  natural  rate.6  Thus,  contrary  to 
Tooke’s  contention,  a  positive  correlation  between 
interest  rates  and  prices  constitutes  no  disproof  of 
the  proposition  that  low  interest  rate  easy-money 
policies  are  inflationary  and  high  interest  rate  tight- 
money  policies  are  deflationary.  To  disprove  these 
propositions  one  would  have  to  demonstrate  that 
price  movements  are  positively  correlated  not  with 
the  market  rate  alone  but  rather  with  the  differential 
between  that  rate  and  the  natural  rate.  Tooke  did not 
do  this.  Hence  his  empirical  correlations  constitute 
no  proof  of  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine.  Nor  do 
they  constitute  disproof  of the  rival  tight-money  view.  The  price  rise  itself  he  held  to  be  the  key  compon- 
ent  of  the  process  by  which  the  market  rate  adjusts 
itself  to  the  natural  rate.  Specifically  he  maintained 
that  under  a  metallic  monetary  system  a  rising  price 
level  affects  market  interest  rates  through  its  prior 
impact  on  bank  reserves.  He  explained  that  rising 
prices  produce  two  kinds  of  gold  drains  that  threaten 
the  depletion  of  banks’  gold  reserves.  One  is  an 
external  drain  to  cover  an  adverse  trade  balance 
stemming  from  the  domestic  inflation.  The  other  is 
an  internal  drain  of  gold  into  hand-to-hand  circula- 
5 What  follows  relies  heavily  on  Patinkin’s  analysis  of 
Wicksell’s  cumulative  process.  See  [4,  pp.  587-97]. 
6 Wicksell  assumed  that  the  market  rate  in  a  metallic 
monetary  system  would  converge  smoothIy  on  the  natu- 
ral  rate without  overshooting.  In  terms  of  his model,  the 
convergent  behavior  of  the  market  rate  can  be  described 
by  substituting  Equation  7  into  Equation  8  to  obtain 
and  then  solving  this  differential  equa- 
tion  for  the  time  path  of  the  market  rate.  The  resulting 
expression  for  the  time  path  of  the  market  rate  is 
where  t  is  time.  e  is  the  base  of  the  natural  logarithm 
system,  and  Ro is  the  initial  disequilibrium  level  of  the 
market  rate.  This  expression  states  that  the  market  rate 
will  converge  smoothly  on  the natural  rate providing  that 
the product  of  the  coefficients  a,  b,  and  c  (i.e.,  the  multi- 
plicative  term  abc)  is  positive,  i.e.,  larger  than  zero. 
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preceding  sections  have  described  Wicksell’s  model 
of  price  level  movements.  It  remains  to  show  how 
his  analysis  helps  answer  current  and  recent  com- 
plaints  that  high  interest  rates  cause  high  prices. 
According  to  Professors  Ritter  and  Silber,  the  best 
answer  to  these  complaints  is  that  high  interest  rates 
accompanied  by  monetary  expansion  are  indeed  in- 
flationary  whereas  high  rates  associated  with  tight 
money-defined  by  them  as  zero  or  negative  money 
growth-are  not.  High  rates,  they  claim,  are  incap- 
able  of  producing  inflation  without  an  accommodative 
expansion  of  the  money  stock.  Without  this  mone- 
tary  expansion,  further  increases  in  the  price  level 
would  be  difficult  to  finance..  At  that  point  the 
higher  interest  rates  would  prevent  further  spending 
and  the  inflationary  process  would  grind  to  a  halt. 
In  short,  higher  interest  rates  are  not  inflationary 
unless  ratified  by  monetary  growth.  The  key  factor, 
they  conclude,  is  the  behavior  of  the  money  stock 
and  not  the  high  interest  rates  themselves.  [5,  pp. 
102-3] 
The  Ritter-Silber  conclusion  is  fully  consistent 
with  Wicksell’s  analysis.  In  his  model  too  the  be- 
havior  of  the  money  stock  distinguishes  cases  where 
high  interest  rates  are  inflationary  from  cases  where 
they  are  not.  This  can  be  shown  by  substituting 
Equations  1-3  into  Equation  4  to  yield 
which  states  that  money  growth  is  directly  related  to 
the  natural  rate-market  rate  differential.  Taken  to- 
gether,  Equations  9  and  7  state  that  if  the  money 
stock  is  growing,  then  high  market  rates  are  indeed 
producing  higher  prices.  For  the  positive  growth  of 
the  money  stock  indicates  that  the  market  rate,  no 
matter  how  high,  is  nevertheless  below  the  natural 
rate  and  is  thus  generating  the  monetary  expansion 
that  supports  a  continuous  rise  in  prices.  Contrari- 
wise,  if  the  money  stock  is  constant  or  falling,  then 
the  market  rate  of  interest,  no  matter  how  high,  is 
noninflationary  or  deflationary.  For  when  money 
growth  is  zero  or  negative  the  market  rate  is  equal  to 
or  above  the  natural  rate  and  is  thereby  tending 
either  to  stabilize  prices  or  to  reduce  them.  Thus, 
contrary  to  the  contentions  of  the  interest  cost-push 
school,  high  interest  rates  associated  with  tight 
money  are  noninflationary. 
Conclusion  This  article  has  reviewed  the  Tooke- 
Wicksell  controversy  concerning  the  influence  of 
interest  rates  on  prices.  The  article  shows  that 
neither  the  anti-inflationary  tight-money  view  nor  its 
rival,  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine,  are  new.  In 
particular,  the  article  disproves  the  recent  claim  that 
“one  of  the  first  economists  to  concern  himself  with 
the  cost-push  effect  of  interest  rate  changes  was  John 
Kenneth  Galbraith.“  [6, p. 1049 n. l]  Contrary  to 
the  foregoing  assertion,  the interest  cost-push  doc- 
trine  long  predates  Galbraith’s  1957  version,  having 
been  enunciated  by  Thomas  Tooke  more  than  100 
years  earlier. 
The  article  also  disproves  the  allegation  that  pro- 
fessional  economists  are  not  even  interested  in  an- 
swering  the  interest  cost-push  doctrine,  i.e.,  that  they 
simply  “refuse  to  take  it  seriously  and  typically  dis- 
miss  it  out  of  hand.”  [5,  p.  100]  Whether  or  not 
this  charge  applies  to  modern  economists,  it  certainly 
does  not  apply  to  Knut  Wicksell.  For,  as  docu- 
mented  in  the  article,  Wicksell  took  the  doctrine 
seriously  enough  to  attempt  to  refute  it  rigorously 
and  systematically.  In  so  doing,  he  provided  the 
definitive  critique  of  the  doctrine.  He  also  developed 
an  analytical  model  that  established  the  theoretical 
foundations  of  the  tight-money  view  and  that  pro- 
vided  a  framework  for  anti-inflationary  monetary 
policy.  His  model  supports  the  current  case  for  tight 
money  just as Tooke’s  views  constitute  a  key  argu- 
ment  underlying  the  opposite  case  for  easier  money 
and  lower  interest  rates.  In  short,  the  ideas  and 
arguments  advanced  in  the  Tooke-Wicksell  debate 
continue  to  survive  and  flourish  in  current  discus- 
sions  of  monetary  policy.  For  better  or  worse,  the 
interest  cost-push  doctrine  refuses  to  die,  thereby 
supporting  George  Stigler’s  contention  that  economic 
theories-  no  matter  how  fallacious-never  perish. 
The  survival  of  the  doctrine  in  the  face  of  Wicksell’s 
criticism  aptly  illustrates  Stigler’s  dictum  that  “there 
is  no  obvious  method  by  which  a  science  can  wholly 
rid  itself  of  once  popular  theories.”  [7,  p.  201] 
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